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I. INTRODUCTION 
In City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments Partnership,1 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the State was a 
property owner in the context of the State’s special assessment 
statutes.2 By answering the question affirmatively, the court 
discounted over seventy years of reliance on attorney general 
opinions that said the State was not an “owner” under the statute.3 
The decision solidified the State’s right to petition a municipality 
 
        †   JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2014; BS, University of 
Minnesota- Twin Cities, 2004. Thank you, Miguel Cisneros, for keeping the family 
on track while I read all day. William A. Blonigan, thank you for being the best 
attorney mentor a daughter could ask for. 
 1.  827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013). 
 2.  Id. at 753. For an example of a special assessment statute defining 
“owner,” see MINN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f) (2012). 
 3.  The original special assessment statute was interpreted in a 1936 attorney 
general opinion. After the Minnesota Legislature consolidated the statute and 
recodified it in 1953, it was again interpreted by the attorney general. See infra Part 
II and notes 21, 29. 
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2013] A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “OWNER” 357 
for improvements payable by special assessment, even though 
municipalities lack statutory authority to bind the State to pay those 
assessments.4 The court’s decision correctly relied on the rules of 
statutory construction by finding that the term “owner” in the 
statute was unambiguous. Yet the decision draws attention to 
important policy considerations that may compel the legislature to 
amend the statute, perhaps to prohibit the State from petitioning 
for special assessments, or alternatively, to allow municipalities to 
bind the State to pay for special assessments.5 
First, this case note will summarize the historical background 
of Minnesota Statutes section 429.0316 and outline the facts of 
Brainerd Investments Partnership.7 Next, it will explore the court’s 
holding and will agree that the court correctly concluded that 
compelling policy arguments and longstanding extrinsic 
interpretations do not nullify the court’s duty to interpret statutes 
according to the law.8 It will also examine how, in addition to 
creating the potential for the State to oblige its neighbors to pay 
special assessments for projects petitioned for by the State, the 
State’s immunity from special assessment creates a source of 
financial uncertainty and instability for municipalities that 
undertake large infrastructure projects at the request of the State.9 
Finally, it concludes that this decision highlights important policy 
considerations that impact all owners of property abutting state-
owned land and, therefore, the legislature should consider 
changing Minnesota’s special assessment statutes to protect both 
private landowners and municipalities from their omnipotent state 
neighbor.10 
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW 
Special assessments in Minnesota are a constitutional creation. 
They defray the cost of local improvements that confer special 
benefits on certain property by requiring contribution from the 
owners of the property abutting such improvements.11 They are 
 
 4.  MINN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2; Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 753. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  See infra Part IV. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The legislature may authorize municipal 
corporations to levy and collect assessments for local improvements upon property 
2
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distinct from other forms of public works funding in that they are 
used to finance specific local improvements. They may only be 
levied against properties that receive a measurable special benefit 
from the improvement, such as improved access to a road, and the 
amount of the charge is directly related to the benefit to the 
property.12 However, municipalities cannot bind the State to pay 
special assessments, even if the improvement benefits the state-
owned property.13 
Under Minnesota law, if the owners of at least thirty-five 
percent of the property abutting a proposed improvement submit a 
petition in favor of funding the improvement by special 
assessment,14 a municipality can pass the resolution to fund the 
improvement by a simple majority.15 This means that if one owner 
owns thirty-five percent or more of the total front footage abutting 
the assessment and that owner petitions for the improvement, the 
city council may approve the resolution by a simple majority, even 
if all other abutting owners disapprove.16 Absent such a petition, a 
four-fifths majority is required.17 This is known as the thirty-five 
percent rule. This procedure applies whenever a municipality 
intends to finance improvements, even partially, by levying special 
assessments.18 
The statute governing the thirty-five percent rule was first 
enacted in 192719 and has been clarified and amended over the 
years.20 In 1936, the Minnesota Attorney General issued an opinion 
to the City of New Ulm in which he stated that “the city is not an 
‘owner’ . . . within the meaning of the . . . statutory provisions and 
 
benefited thereby without regard to cash valuation.”). 
 12.  MINN. STAT. § 429.051 (2012); LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, INFORMATION 
MEMO: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE 2 (2011), available at http://www.lmc.org/media 
/document/1/sagtext.pdf. 
 13.  MINN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2. 
 14.  Id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. § 429.021, subdiv. 3 (“When any portion of the cost of an 
improvement is defrayed by special assessments, the procedure prescribed in this 
chapter shall be followed . . . .”). 
 19.  See Act approved Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 185, § 1, 1927 Minn. Laws 279, 279 
(“In any city of the fourth class . . . the council shall have power to improve any 
street . . . when petitioned for by the owners of not less than thirty-five percent (35%) in 
frontage of the real property abutting on such street . . . .”). 
 20.  MINN. STAT. § 429.031 (amended 1953, 1955, 1957, 1961, 1963, 1965, 
1967, 1973, 1984 (four amendments), 1986, 1994, 1996, and 2000). 
3
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2013] A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “OWNER” 359 
[city] . . . property should be excluded by the city authorities in 
determining the sufficiency of the petition.”21 
In 1949, the language of the 1927 statute 22 was transplanted 
into a newly reorganized chapter dedicated to special assessments.23 
In 1953, it was incorporated into the current special assessments 
chapter.24 There is no record of the legislature expressing 
disagreement with the 1936 attorney general opinion,25 and the 
1953 version of the statute did not define “owner.”26 The following 
year, the attorney general issued two more opinions interpreting 
“owner” in the newly consolidated statute.27 The first of these two 
opinions answered a related question about the same statute and 
relied almost entirely on the 1936 opinion.28 In that letter the 
 
 21.  Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 
133, 134–35 (June 30, 1936). In this opinion, the attorney general relied on the 
following foreign precedent: Herman v. City of Omaha, 106 N.W. 593, 595 (Neb. 
1906) (stating that “the right to petition should be confined to the individual 
taxpayer who bears the greater part of the burden imposed by the special 
assessment,” and holding that the city did not have the right to petition itself); 
Armstrong v. City of Ogden, 43 P. 119, 121 (Utah 1895) (holding that the city’s 
property should not be included in calculations to determine whether a petition 
for special improvements had been signed by the requisite number of votes). 
 22.  Act approved Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 185, sec. 1815, § 1, 1927 Minn. Laws 279, 
279 (repealed 1949). 
 23. Act effective July 1, 1949, ch. 119, § 51, 1949 Minn. Laws 146, 177 
(repealed 1953).  
 24.  See Act approved Apr. 17, 1953, ch. 398, § 3, 1953 Minn. Laws 465, 468; 
City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 762 (Minn. 2013). 
 25.  See Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 762. 
 26.  See MINN. STAT. § 429.031 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 412.411 (1949) (repealed 
1953); Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 762. The recodification was part of the 
consolidation of several statutes pertaining to special assessments and was 
intended to create an integrated chapter on the topic from a plethora of related 
laws spread throughout the Minnesota Statutes. The appellants contended that 
these circumstances justified deference to the attorney general’s opinions. In their 
brief, they stated in part: 
The Attorney General’s opinions are especially important, because 
they bracket in time the comprehensive consolidation of Minnesota’s 
special assessment statutes . . . . [T]he drafters of Chapter 429 included 
a task force of experienced municipal practitioners . . . . If they had 
wanted to change that rule they surely would not have left the pre-1953 
language unamended. 
Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 21, Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 
812 N.W.2d 885 (No. A11-644, -1471), 2011 WL 7807383. 
 27.  Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y 
Gen. 1, 1–2 (Oct. 28, 1954); Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387-B-10 Op. Minn. 
Att’y Gen. 1, 1–5 (June 29, 1954). 
 28.  Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387-B-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. at 1–5 
(stating in reference to the attorney general’s opinion of 1936, “Upon its 
4
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attorney general concluded that, in determining the adequacy of a 
petition to make improvements, it was not necessary to consider 
city-owned property.29 
A few months later, the attorney general again weighed in on 
how the statute applies to state-owned property.30 This last opinion 
echoed the previous opinions and concluded that the State was not 
an owner within the meaning of the statute because the city could 
not require the State to pay special assessments.31 Therefore, 
according to this opinion, state land was not considered in 
calculating whether there was sufficient landowner support for a 
petition, and the State was not eligible to petition “for or in favor of 
the improvement.”32 
Since 1954, the statute has been amended fifteen times.33 
In two of those amendments, the legislature addressed the 
meaning of the word “owner.” In 1961, the legislature added a 
provision strengthening notice requirements for owners, defining 
“owner” for the purpose of mailed notice, and explicitly 
acknowledging tax exempt owners as owners deserving of notice.34 
In 1967, the provision defining “owner” enacted in the 1961 
amendment was rewritten; however, the explicit acknowledgment 
of tax exempt owners remained intact.35 Additionally, a 1996 
 
authority, your first question is answered in the negative”). 
 29.  Id. at 4. 
 30.  Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y 
Gen. at 2. 
 31.  Id. (“Since the property of the State abutting upon the street named as 
the location for the improvement is not subject to a special assessment for the 
improvement contemplated it is my opinion that [the State] is not an ‘owner’ 
within the requirements of 429.031 . . . .”); see also Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 
387-B-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. at 4; Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 
56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 135 (June 30, 1936) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 1815 
(Mason 1927)) (“[T]he city is not an ‘owner’ of such abutting park property 
within the meaning of the . . . statutory provisions . . . .”). 
 32.  Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y 
Gen. at 2. 
 33.  See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 34.  Act effective Jan. 1, 1962, ch. 525, § 5, 1961 Minn. Laws 910, 913 
(inserting three sentences requiring notice be mailed to owners of parcels within 
the proposed assessment area not less than ten days before a hearing, defining 
“owners” for the purpose of mailed notice as those shown as of thirty days prior to 
the adoption of the resolution providing for the hearing, and providing a special 
procedure for identifying tax exempt owners and obtaining waiver of notice by tax 
exempt owners). 
 35.  See Act approved Mar. 10, 1967, ch. 57, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 136, 136 
(amending the 1961 provision defining owner for the purpose of mailed notice by 
deleting the thirty-day qualification). 
5
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amendment made several changes to the wording of the statute 
apparently aimed at modernizing the language and improving 
clarity.36 In 2013, the Minnesota Legislature proposed, but did not 
pass, an amendment to section 435.19. The amendment would 
have given municipalities the ability to bind the State to pay 
assessments, while allowing the State to maintain its ability to 
negotiate the amount it would pay.37 Additionally, the amendment 
would have required the State to appropriate a set amount of funds 
each year to pay special assessments levied against the State.38 
There was an additional proposal to appropriate $2 million in the 
form of a reimbursement grant to the City of Moose Lake.39 
For reasons explained in Part IV, this proposal passed. 
III. FACTS OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Roger and Elizabeth Anda,40 and James 
Martin, own several apartment buildings located across College 
 
 36.  See Act of Apr. 2, 1996, ch. 402, § 1, 1996 Minn. Laws 542, 542–43. 
For example, this amendment changed “[n]ot less than 10 days before the 
hearing, notice thereof shall also be mailed to the owner of each parcel within the 
area proposed to be assessed” to “[n]ot less than 10 days before the hearing, 
notice of the hearing must also be mailed to the owner of each parcel within the 
area proposed to be assessed.” Id. The amendment also changed “[f]or the 
purpose of giving mailed notice, owners shall be those shown to be such on the 
records of the county auditor” to “[f]or the purpose of giving mailed notice, 
owners are those shown as owners on the records of the county auditor.” Id. 
 37.  S.F. 552, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 33, subdiv. 2 (Minn. 2013). 
This proposed amendment would have required the city to determine the amount 
that would have been assessed had the public land been privately owned and, 
although the State would have retained its ability to pay an amount less than the 
amount determined by the city, the last two sentences of the current version, 
which prohibit a municipality from binding the State by assessments, were 
eliminated. Id.  
 38.  Id. art. 2, § 34, subdiv. 6(a) (“There is annually appropriated from the 
general fund and credited to the agency assessment account in the special revenue 
fund, $5,000,000 in fiscal year 2014 and each year thereafter. Money in the agency 
assessment account is appropriated annually to the commissioner of revenue for 
grants to reimburse instrumentalities, departments, or agencies for payment of 
special assessments, as required under subdivision 2.”). 
 39.  Id. art. 2, § 34, subdiv. 6(b). 
 40.  Roger and Elizabeth Anda own land and businesses around the State of 
Minnesota and have been involved in other real estate related litigation, including 
a recent case that also reached the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Moorhead 
Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. 2010). That case 
considered issues related to eminent domain and reimbursement for mitigation of 
contaminated soil. See id. 
6
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Drive from Central Lakes College (CLC) in Brainerd, Minnesota.41 
In 2008, the Brainerd City Council began to explore the possibility 
of expanding College Drive due to increased traffic.42 The Council 
proposed a combination of funding sources for the project, 
including federal stimulus funds and state-aid funding.43 The 
project also required local cost sharing, but the Council was 
opposed to the use of general tax revenues.44 Instead, some 
members of the Council proposed the use of special assessments on 
adjacent properties to meet the local contribution requirements.45 
The Council lacked the requisite four-fifths majority to pass 
the resolution without a petition and could not invoke the thirty-
five percent rule because no petition was forthcoming.46 The city 
engineer sent a letter to the vice president of administrative 
services for CLC to inquire whether CLC, an entity of the State, 
would consider submitting a petition for the improvements.47 
Although CLC did not make a firm financial commitment at that 
time, the vice president expressed willingness to submit a petition 
and pay a portion of the special assessments.48 On November 15, 
2010, CLC formally petitioned the Council, and on December 6, 
2010, the Council approved the resolution by a four-to-three vote.49 
Though CLC had not committed to an exact dollar amount at the 
time of the Council’s vote, CLC and the city maintain that CLC 
made a financial commitment prior to the vote.50 
 
 41.  Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 1. 
 42.  Id. at 4. 
 43.  Id. at 5. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. In the spring of 2008, the city engineer recommended against special 
assessments because, in his opinion, “the proposed project [was] being driven by 
increasing regional traffic demand in the corridor, not the adjacent land 
uses . . . .” Id. 
 46.  Id. at 5–7. 
 47.  Id. at 6; see also City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752, 
754 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the State owns over thirty-nine percent of the 
property abutting the project area). 
 48.  Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 6, Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 812 N.W.2d 
885 (No. A11-644, -1471), 2011 WL 7807384 (stating that CLC was in favor of the 
improvements because of the focus on improving safety). 
 49.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754. 
 50.  Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 7. Respondents 
stated on the record that the petition represented CLC’s agreement to pay the 
assessment. Id. at 7. The final assessment amount totaled $359,882.80. On 
December 17, 2009, CLC sent a letter to the City specifically agreeing that the 
improvements would benefit the College and agreeing to pay the assessment. Id. at 
7–8. CLC further asserts that it waived its right to challenge the assessment as 
7
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In response to these events, the appellants initiated an 
injunction action, claiming the petition was invalid.51 The 
appellants argued that the State was not eligible to petition for 
improvements because it could not be bound to pay special 
assessments and, therefore, was not an “owner” within the meaning 
of the statute.52 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
The district court granted the City’s motion, concluding that the 
word “owner” was unambiguous and the State was an “owner” 
eligible to petition, and dismissed the appellants’ claims.53 The 
court of appeals affirmed, holding that “owner” must be “construed 
according to the rules of grammar and ‘common and approved 
usage.’”54 
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals, relying on 
Minnesota Statutes section 645.0855 and the dictionary definition of 
the word “owner.”56 The court concluded that it was not necessary 
to consider the attorney general opinions or legislative history to 
determine the meaning of the statute because the statute was not 
ambiguous on its face.57 Because the ambiguity threshold was not 
met, the court declined to consider extrinsic sources.58 
 
excessive or demand hearings, and that it budgeted for the assessments pursuant 
to section 435.19, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes. Id. at 7–8; accord 
Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754 n.2. 
 51.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754. 
 52.  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 53.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 755. 
 54.  Id. (citing City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 812 N.W.2d 885, 
891–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)). 
 55.  MINN. STAT. § 645.08(1) (“[W]ords and phrases are construed according 
to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning, 
or are defined in this chapter, are construed according to such special meaning or 
their definition.”). 
 56.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 756; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 
(9th ed. 2009) (defining owner as “[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and 
convey something”). 
 57.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 753 (“Because we conclude that the 
State is an ‘owner’ of property under the plain language of the statute, we 
affirm.”); see also id. at 756 (“The Legislature did not make any distinctions among 
owners in section 429.031, subdivision 1(f) . . . . Moreover, the Legislature has 
demonstrated that when it intends to treat property owned by the State differently 
from privately-owned property, the Legislature knows how to make the distinction  
clear.”). See generally MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their 
application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter 
of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”). 
 58.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 757; see MINN. STAT. § 645.16. 
8
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The dissent, however, argued that the plain language of the 
statute, when analyzed in the context of the statute as a whole, 
“clearly establishe[d] that the State is not an ‘owner’ under the 
35 percent owner rule.”59 Specifically, the dissent pointed out that 
subdivision three of the same provision, which governs the 
requirements of a “unanimity petition,”60 requires that the owners 
signing the petition agree to pay the full cost of the project.61 
Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation would create two 
inconsistent interpretations of the word “owner” in the same statute 
and, therefore, by considering the context of the entire statute,62 
the dissent concluded that “owners” must actually mean “owners of 
assessable property.”63 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The court’s holding in Brainerd Investments Partnership, in 
addition to confirming that the statute is not ambiguous, highlights 
two policy issues that arise from the court’s interpretation and the 
underlying structure of Minnesota’s special assessment statute. 
First, because the State has the power to petition for improvements, 
private landowners neighboring state-owned property may, subject 
to approval by elected officials, be powerless to avoid special 
assessments if the State decides to petition for improvements under 
the thirty-five percent rule.64 Second, because municipalities cannot 
levy binding assessments against the State, cities are at risk of being 
left with no means of paying for large structural improvements that 
the State has asked them to undertake and for which the city is 
powerless to bind the State to pay.65 
 
 59.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 758 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 60.  A unanimity petition is one signed by all owners of land abutting the 
proposed improvement in which they all agree to pay the full amount of the 
assessment. See MINN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 3. 
 61.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 760 (citing MINN. STAT. § 429.031, 
subdiv. 3). 
 62.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 759 (“Our case law mandates that we 
look at [the statute] ‘as a whole and interpret each section in light of the 
surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.’” (citing Eng’g & Constr. 
Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Buldoc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 711 (Minn. 2013))); 
see also MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (“The object of all interpretation and construction of 
laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall 
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”). 
 63.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 760. 
 64.  See id. at 758. 
 65.  That private landowners would be fearful of solidifying the power to 
9
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Furthermore, empowering the State to petition causes tension 
between local and state priorities because of the potential to leave 
either the private owner or the municipality with the bill if the State 
refuses payment.66 On the other hand, simply allowing the State to 
petition does not commit municipalities or private landowners to a 
project.67 A petition submitted under section 429.031 does not 
negate other protections built into the special assessment statutes.68 
Municipal city councils may still choose not to approve the 
project,69 and private landowners may still challenge special 
assessments under the special benefits test or on procedural 
grounds.70 
A. The Question of Ambiguity 
While it may be tempting to frame the Brainerd Investments 
Partnership decision around fairness to private landowners, the 
court’s decision to leave such policy questions to the legislature 
appears to be a common approach.71 What is more, this approach 
provides an opening for the legislature to take a broader look at 
the statute and consider the impact of the current framework when 
municipalities and the State do not cooperate. The court’s decision 
in Brainerd Investments Partnership came down to the threshold 
 
petition for special assessments makes sense because the State may elect not to pay 
its portion of the very assessment for which it petitioned. See MINN. STAT. § 435.19, 
subdiv. 2. 
 66.  See infra text accompanying notes 135–43. 
 67.  See MINN. STAT. § 429.061 (outlining required special assessment 
procedures). 
 68.  See id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f); infra text accompanying notes 69–70. 
 69.  MINN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f) (“[T]he improvement may be adopted 
at any time within six months after the date of the hearing by vote of a majority of 
all members of the council . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 70.  See id. § 429.061 (explaining the special benefits test); id. § 429.031, 
subdiv. 1 (requiring a published plan, notice, and public hearing before special 
assessments can be levied). See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Legal Forms § 236:1 (2009) 
(“Special or local assessments may be levied for a wide range of purposes, 
providing that the improvement for which the assessment is levied confers a 
benefit to the property assessed, which is . . . special to the property rather than 
general to the community as a whole.”); 70C AM. JUR. 2D Special or Local Assessments 
§ 29 (2011) (“A legislative body cannot by its fiat make a local improvement of that 
which in its essence is not such an improvement, and it cannot by its fiat make a 
special benefit to sustain a special assessment where there is no special benefit.”). 
 71.  See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. State ex rel Harless, 117 P.2d 87 (Ariz. 1941); 
City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 5 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1931); Esling v. Krambeck, 663 N.W.2d 
671 (S.D. 2003); Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63 (Utah 1998); Armstrong v. 
Ogden City, 43 P. 119 (Utah 1895), aff’d, 168 U.S. 224 (1897). 
10
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question of whether Minnesota Statutes section 435.19 is 
ambiguous.72 Both the majority and the dissent offer well-developed 
arguments on this point. Had the appellants successfully 
established that the statute was ambiguous, thereby allowing the 
court to consider extrinsic sources in its interpretation, their 
position would have been much stronger and more persuasive due 
to the important policy questions in play and the inequities 
inherent in the plain interpretation of the statute.73 
Justice Anderson argues that relying on the common meaning 
of the word “owner” causes the word to have two different 
meanings within the same statute because if the State is an owner 
within the meaning of the statute it would be impossible to obtain a 
valid unanimity petition.74 This may not be as natural a conclusion 
as Justice Anderson determines it is. Minnesota Statutes section 
429.031, subdivision 3 does not explicitly state that a unanimity 
petition may not be signed by the State;75 rather, it says “[w]henever 
all owners of real property abutting upon any street named as the 
location of any improvement shall petition the council to construct 
the improvement and to assess the entire cost against their 
property, the council may . . . adopt a resolution . . . ordering that 
improvement.”76 Thus, the statute requires (1) that all owners of 
property abutting the street named as the location of the 
improvement sign the petition; and (2) that they agree that the 
entire cost of the project shall be assessed against their property.77 
The dissent’s interpretation of the statute requires an inference 
that the State may not be voluntarily assessed.78 
 
 72.  City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. 
2013). 
 73.  Id. at 758 (“We acknowledge that the current statutory framework grants 
the State discretion to determine if, and how much, it should be assessed. We also 
recognize that interpreting the word ‘owner’ to include the State could reduce the 
ability of private landowners to prevent improvements if they own property 
adjacent to state-owned land.”). 
 74.  Id. at 761 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson quotes section 
435.19, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes, reasoning that “to have a valid 
unanimity petition, ‘all owners’ upon which the ‘entire cost’ can be assessed must 
sign the petition.” Id. Thus, because the State cannot be assessed, they may not 
sign a unanimity petition. Id. 
 75.  MINN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 3. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  In some jurisdictions, if an entity or party voluntarily pays an assessment, 
the payment does not qualify as an assessment because an assessment is a tax and 
taxes are, by definition, involuntary. See, e.g., Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63 
11
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In support of its argument, the dissent relied on the Supreme 
Court of Utah’s decision in Armstrong v. Ogden City.79 In that case, 
Ogden City created an improvement district for street repavement, 
which included 660 frontage feet owned by the city and used for 
the city hall.80 The court found that the city did not have 
jurisdiction to create the improvement district because the owners 
of more than fifty percent of the front footage objected to the 
proposal within the time required.81 Though the statute did not 
require the signatures of fifty percent of the assessable owners, the 
court concluded that city property should not be included in the 
calculation of the percentage of protests.82 The Ogden court 
decided the case on policy grounds, rather than the plain meaning 
of the statute, opining that otherwise “the statute would become 
inoperative.”83 In fact, the statute would not become inoperative; 
rather, it would operate in a way that the court thought “would 
produce great injustice.”84 
In Brainerd Investments Partnership, the majority did not agree 
with this reasoning. Instead, the court concluded that although 
 
(Utah 1998). It is not clear whether this is the law in Minnesota. See Oral 
Argument at 26:35, 58:25, City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 
752 (Minn. 2013) (No. A11-644, -1471), available at http://www.tpt.org/courts 
/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A110644. It is also not clear whether 
or why a voluntary assessment paid by the State would not qualify as an assessment 
within the meaning of the statute, while a voluntary assessment paid by private 
landowners, who demonstrate their voluntary agreement by signing a petition, 
must qualify to give any meaning at all to the provision. Furthermore, the phrase 
“assessed against their property” could be interpreted to refer to the property 
collectively, without regard to how the assessment is divided. See MINN. STAT. 
§ 435.19, subdiv. 3. 
 79.  43 P. 119 (Utah 1895). 
 80.  Id. at 120. This case is distinguishable from Brainerd Investments Partnership 
because (1) the city was petitioning itself; and (2) the city did not contribute any 
funds toward the project. 
 81.  Id. at 120–21. 
 82.  Id. at 120 (citing Utah’s special assessment statute, which prohibited 
creation of an improvement district “[i]f at or before the time fixed written 
objections to such improvements [are] signed by the owners of one half of the 
front feet abutting upon that portion of the street.” (emphasis added)). 
 83.  See id. at 121. 
 84.  Id. (“If, for instance, the city council should create a paving district out of 
the four portions of streets that surround a square used exclusively for city 
purposes, it would only be necessary to secure the consent of the owner of a single 
front foot of property abutting upon the opposite side of the street from the 
public square to abstain from protesting, and the remaining frontage would not 
only be powerless to prevent the improvement, but would be compelled to pay 
practically the entire expense.”). While it is true that this might seem unfair, it 
does not render the statute inoperative. 
12
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definitions of ‘owner’ that differ from the plain meaning could 
yield other reasonable interpretations, because application of the 
plain meaning resulted in only one reasonable interpretation, the 
statute was not ambiguous.85 Thus, the court declined to consider 
interpretations that required using a definition other than the 
plain meaning, as well as extrinsic sources such as the attorney 
general opinions and legislative history.86 
B. Support for the Plain Meaning Approach in Minnesota and in Other 
Jurisdictions 
Minnesota Statutes section 645.16 supports the plain meaning 
approach to the interpretation adopted by the majority. That 
statute states, “When the words of a law in their application to an 
existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of 
the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the 
spirit.”87 Several recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases have relied 
on this portion of section 645.16 to interpret other statutes and 
have come to conclusions that parallel the holding in Brainerd 
Investments Partnership.88 
 
 85.  City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752, 757 
(Minn. 2013). Another possible interpretation of subdivision 3 is that it limits the 
ability of private landowners whose land abuts state land to petition at all. 
Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 30. Alternatively, it 
could mean that a petition signed by all of the neighbors but not the public entity 
is unanimous, or that the legislature intended that the State be able to sign a 
unanimous petition, just like any other owner, as long as it agreed to pay its share 
of the assessment. But see Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvements of, 56 Op. 
Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 134 (June 30, 1936). The latter interpretation seems to 
make sense in the context of the statute because it creates an explicit purpose for 
Minnesota Statutes section 435.19, which provides that the city may determine the 
amount the State would pay if it were assessable. 
 86.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 87.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012). 
 88.  See, e.g., N. States Power v. Aleckson, 831 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2013) 
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16) (“When a statute’s language is ‘clear and free from 
all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing the spirit.”); Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 
836 (Minn. 2012) (“If the language of the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, 
the court’s role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore the spirit 
or purpose of the law.”); Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., 819 N.W.2d 129, 
134 (Minn. 2012) (“Given that the Legislature has specifically designated school 
districts as public corporations,  . . . excluding school districts from the definition 
of ‘corporation’ . . . simply because other statutes refer separately to ‘corporations’ 
and ‘school districts’ ignores the plain meaning of [the statute].” (citations 
omitted)); Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka, 783 N.W.2d 721, 726 
(Minn. 2010) (“If the law is ‘clear and free from all ambiguity,’ the plain meaning 
13
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Other jurisdictions also interpret statutes that deal with 
petitions made by landowners in much the same way as Minnesota. 
For example, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided a similar 
case, involving a petition to annex land, based on a plain language 
reading of that statute. In Esling v. Krambeck 89 the county presented 
a voluntary petition to the City of Spearfish to annex certain county 
lands, including a public airport, and make them part of the city.90 
South Dakota law requires that the owners of at least three-fourths 
of the value of the land proposed to be annexed sign the petition.91 
A group of citizens challenged the sufficiency of the petition 
arguing, among other things, “that the term ‘value’ in [the relevant 
statute] means only the ‘assessed value’ of real property subject to 
voluntary annexation”92 
Ultimately, the court found that value did not mean “assessed 
value” and upheld the sufficiency of the petition, stating, “SDCL 9-
4-1 does not expressly state that the ‘value of the territory’ must be 
the assessed value. If the legislature had intended to limit ‘value’ to 
‘assessed value,’ it certainly could have done so.”93 
Thus, under a plain meaning interpretation of the statute, the 
court interpreted “value” according to its common meaning. The 
court noted that courts in other jurisdictions had found that the 
assessed value must be used in voluntary annexations; however, it 
distinguished those cases on the basis that, unlike the South Dakota 
Statute, “those cases all dealt with statutes that included the word 
‘assessed’ or some variation of it.”94 
 
controls and is not disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 89.  Esling v. Krambeck, 663 N.W.2d 671 (S.D. 2003). 
 90.  Id. at 674. 
 91.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-4-1 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) 
(“The governing body of a municipality, upon receipt of a written petition . . . may 
by resolution include such territory or any part thereof within such municipality if 
the petition is signed by not less than three-fourths of the registered voters and by 
the owners of not less than three-fourths of the value of the territory sought to be 
annexed to the municipality.”). 
 92.  Esling, 633 N.W.2d at 676. 
 93.  Id. at 677. “The ordinary meaning of the term ‘value’ is ‘the monetary 
worth or price of something; the amount of goods, services, or money that 
something will command in an exchange.’” Id. at 676 (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1549 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 94.  Id. at 676 (citing City of Phoenix v. State, 117 P.2d 87 (Ariz. 1941)); 
People ex rel. Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 78 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969); Johnson 
v. City of Spokane, 577 P.2d 164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). 
14
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Utah confronted a similar problem of statutory construction 
and resolved the question by relying on the plain language 
approach. In Pappas v. Richfield City 95 the Supreme Court of Utah 
was confronted with the question of whether land owned by a 
school district, which was immune from special assessments, should 
be counted in the calculation of assessable frontage to determine if 
sufficient protests had been submitted in opposition to the creation 
of a special improvement district (SID).96 The school district 
supported the project and had voluntarily agreed to pay an 
assessment; however, a group of private landowners, following 
statutory procedure, filed protests to the creation of the SID.97 
The statute required at least fifty percent of the owners of 
assessable front footage to file protests within a certain period of 
time to impede the creation of the district.98 The city’s calculations 
revealed that if the school district property was included in the 
calculation of total front footage, the protests filed amounted to 
only forty-five percent of the front footage, not sufficient to defeat 
the SID.99 But if the school district property was excluded, then the 
protests would equal fifty-three percent of the front footage and 
would defeat the SID.100 
The district court held that the city had properly included the 
school district property in their calculations, but the Utah Supreme 
Court overturned, relying on a literal reading of the statute.101 
[The] statute . . . provides that “the necessary number of 
protests [to defeat a SID] means the aggregate of the 
following: (i) protests representing one-half of the front 
footage to be assessed where an assessment is proposed to 
be made according to frontage.” The dispositive issue in 
this case is therefore whether the school district property 
was “to be assessed” within the meaning of 17A-3-
307(3)(b)(i). We hold that it was not because such 
property is exempt from local assessments.102 
 
 95.  962 P.2d 63 (Utah 1998). 
 96.  Id. at 65. 
 97.  See id. at 64–65. 
 98.  Id. at 66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-307(3)(b)(i) (repealed 2007)). 
 99.  Id. at 64. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 65–66. 
 102.  Id. at 66 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Pappas 
court declined to adopt the city’s interpretation that Ogden stands for the narrow 
proposition that land may be excluded from calculations only if the owner of 
public property does not agree to pay its fair share of the assessments. Id. at 65. 
15
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Thus, by applying the same plain language approach, the court 
found for the private landowners because, unlike the Minnesota 
statue, this Utah statute explicitly used the words “to be assessed.”103 
The Arizona Supreme Court has also interpreted that state’s 
special assessment statute very literally. In City of Phoenix v. Wilson104 
the court was asked to determine whether a public park abutting 
the proposed assessed area should be counted for the purpose of 
determining whether sufficient protests had been signed in 
opposition to the proposed improvement.105 The court held that if 
“public property is expressly exempted from a special improvement 
assessment” that property should not be considered in determining 
whether sufficient owners have protested against the assessment.106 
“[B]ut . . . where . . . the municipality has become obligated to pay 
its proportionate share of the cost of the improvement . . . such 
frontage should be included in passing upon this question.”107 In so 
holding, the court stated that “[t]he Legislature of Arizona . . . very 
carefully provided . . . that when the proposed improvement was 
ordered, unless the resolution of intention expressly excluded the 
city property from the assessment, the municipality itself should be 
liable for its proportionate share of the expenses.”108 
 
Instead, the court held that even a voluntary agreement by the school district to 
pay an amount equal to the proposed assessment would not be sufficient 
justification to count the school district’s property because a contractual payment 
is not the same as an assessment, which is a tax. Id. at 66. Therefore, whether the 
school district actually paid or not was irrelevant because the statute, literally 
construed, designated that only assessable front footage is included in the 
calculation. See id. 
 103.  Id. at 66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-307(3)(b)(i)). This holding is 
especially interesting in light of the fact that Utah is the jurisdiction that decided 
Ogden, the case upon which the dissent and the Minnesota Attorney General rely 
and which ignored the plain meaning of the statute in favor of equity. 
See Armstrong v. Ogden City, 43 P. 119 (Utah 1895). 
 104.  5 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1931). 
 105.  Id. at 411 (finding that if a publicly owned park were counted in 
determining the total frontage, the protests filed would be less than the statutorily 
required fifty percent, but if the public land were not counted, the protests would 
represent more than fifty percent of the total frontage in the district). 
 106.  Id. at 413. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 412. In another Arizona case decided a decade later, the court held 
that the school district was not qualified to sign a petition for annexation because 
the district’s land was not subject to taxation or assessment. City of Phoenix v. 
State ex rel. Harless, 117 P.2d 87, 88 (Ariz. 1941). The statute at issue stated that 
the petition should be signed by “the owners of not less than one-half in value of 
the property in any territory contiguous to the city, as shown by the last assessment 
of said property.” Id. at 87. Because the property was not subject to taxation it was 
16
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The interpretations by these various courts support the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s plain meaning interpretation of the 
Minnesota statute; however, they also recognize in some way the 
potential for injustice to the private landowner whose land abuts an 
improvement also abutting publicly owned property.109 It seems that 
Utah, in Ogden City, is an outlier in that it decided the case on 
grounds of equity rather than the rules of statutory construction.110 
C. The Other Side of the Coin: The City of Moose Lake 
Lack of a clear statutory mechanism for the city to bind the 
state to pay special assessments can create inefficiency and waste for 
both the city and the state, and can make it difficult for city leaders 
to work with the state to make infrastructure improvements 
benefiting state land.111 One such recent case involved the City of 
Moose Lake, Minnesota. In that case, the State backed out of an 
agreement to help finance a major sewer system upgrade intended 
primarily to benefit a state-run treatment center and prison, 
forcing the city to cancel the final phase of construction and lose 
substantial investments.112 
When a municipality decides to complete improvements that 
will benefit state property, the municipality and state may choose to 
negotiate a plan for the project and the amount the state will pay 
toward the project.113 These costs may be levied as voluntary special 
assessments, or they may be paid through another financing 
mechanism.114 Sometimes, such as in Brainerd Investments 
 
not on the assessment roll and, therefore, the owner of the property was not 
eligible to petition. Id. at 89.  
 109.  See Wilson, 5 P.2d at 412. 
 110.  See Armstrong v. Ogden City, 43 P. 119, 121 (Utah 1895) (“[W]e think 
that the establishment of such a rule would not only be wrong in principle and 
wrong in theory, but it would also be contrary to the spirit and intention of the 
statutes providing for special improvement assessments.”). 
 111.  Telephone Interview with Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake, 
Minn. (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Mayor Shaw I]. 
 112.  See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.  
 113.  See MINN. STAT. § 429.051 (2012); City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. 
P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013); LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 12, 
at 29. 
 114.  See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations § 99 (noting 
that the issuance of bonds is governed by state statute and bonds are usually 
authorized “for the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, 
addition to, and operation of . . . ’public project[s]’”); Jeanette Behr, Infrastructure 
Needs: Financing Infrastructure Improvements, MINN. CITIES MAG., Aug. 2009, at 6, 6, 
available at http://www.lmc.org/media/document/1/financing_infrastructure.pdf 
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Partnership, a municipality and the state may come to an agreement 
and sign a contract binding the state to contribute some portion of 
the cost of the project.115 Other times, such as in the case of Moose 
Lake, the process of voluntary contribution breaks down. Moose 
Lake’s experience demonstrates the financial vulnerability of 
municipalities and how a special assessment statute allowing 
municipalities to bind the state, in the same way other landowners 
are bound, could create security for municipalities, reduce 
opportunities for wasteful reimbursement appropriations, and 
reduce tension between the state and municipalities. 
The City of Moose Lake is a small town in northern Minnesota 
with a population of about 2751 people and a total area of 3.66 
square miles.116 The city is an important hub for Minnesota’s state 
park system,117 and it is also home to two state-run facilities, 
including a prison operated by the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections (DOC),118 and a treatment center for sex offenders 
called the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP).119 
 
(“Cities can generate funds for infrastructure projects in a variety of ways, 
including issuing debt (bonds) or certificates of indebtedness; levying property 
taxes; charging service fees; using development agreements; using statutory 
financing tools such as special assessments; and using land use-related funding.”) 
 115.  Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 752. 
 116.  John Hall, Census Data for Moose Lake, ROADSIDE THOUGHTS, 
http://www.roadsidethoughts.com/mn/moose-lake-census.html (last modified 
Nov. 5, 2013); Moose Lake City, Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml 
(search “Moose Lake”) (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 117.  The city’s parks serve as a trailhead for the Willard-Munger trail system 
that stretches 159 miles from the city of Duluth all the way to the cities of 
Minneapolis and Saint Paul and several regionally significant snowmobile and bike 
trails. See State Trails, MINN. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us 
/state_trails/willard_munger/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Find a 
State Trail by Location, MINN. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us 
/state_trails/map.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
 118.  Facility Information: Willow River/Moose Lake, MINN. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/facilities/willowriver.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) 
(stating a total population of 1045 inmates as of September 16, 2013). 
 119.  Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVICES, 
http://mn.gov/dhs/ (follow “A-Z Topics” hyperlink; then follow “MN Sex 
Offender Program” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“The Minnesota Sex 
Offender Program (MSOP) provides services to individuals who have been court-
ordered to receive sex offender treatment. MSOP clients have completed their 
prison sentences and are civilly committed by the courts and placed in sex 
offender treatment for an indeterminate period of time. A civil court may commit 
a person for sex offender treatment if a judge determines that the individual is 
a ’sexual psychopathic personality,’ a ‘sexually dangerous person,’ or both.”). 
18
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The prison houses approximately 1050 inmates, and it is 
located within the city limits on state-owned land.120 The MSOP 
facility houses approximately 503 civilly committed individuals who 
have completed prison sentences for sex-related crimes but who 
have been deemed too dangerous to release.121 Thus, over half of 
the population of Moose Lake is institutionalized.122 Both the 
prison and treatment center depend on the city for various 
infrastructure needs.123 Specifically, because the combined facilities 
house approximately fifty-six percent of the total population, they 
are the largest users of the city’s sewer collection system and 
municipal electric utility.124 
Approximately eighty-one percent of the land within the city 
limits of Moose Lake is tax exempt.125 About fifty percent of that is 
state-owned land.126 Because the city’s tax base comes from around 
twenty-five percent of the land area and less than fifty percent of 
the population,127 which is equal to about 650 households, the city 
is challenged to spread those tax dollars to maintain infrastructure 
across the entire city.128 
In 2005, the DOC and MSOP approached the City of Moose 
Lake about increasing the city’s sewer system capacity to 
 
 120.  See Bill Authorizing the City of Moose Lake to Impose a Local Sales and Use Tax: 
Hearing on S.F. 1053 Before the Tax Reform Div. of the S. Tax Comm.,  
88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www 
.senate.leg.state.mn.us/media/media_video_popup.php?flv=cmte_taxesreform 
_040413.flv (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake); Facility 
Information, supra note 118. 
 121.  Minnesota Sex Offender Program Statistics, MINN. DEP’T HUM. 
SERVICES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService 
=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased& 
dDocName=dhs16_151535. 
 122.  This estimate includes inmates at the two state-run incarceration 
facilities, as well as those residing in either a nursing home or hospital located 
inside the city limits. See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Tom Paul, Flood 
Manager, City of Moose Lake). 
 123.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. 
 124.  Id. In addition to connecting to the city’s sewer collection system and 
electric utility, the facilities require fire and police service from the city. Id. 
The city expends substantial police resources at the MSOP facility because, due to 
the nature of the program, guards are prohibited from carrying firearms. Id. 
 125.  Moose Lake City Council Minutes 6 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http:// 
www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/Archived_Minutes/March%202007.docx; 
Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. 
 126.  See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of 
Moose Lake). 
 127.  See id. 
 128.  See id. (statement of Tom Paul, Flood Manager, City of Moose Lake). 
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accommodate projected growth at both facilities.129 Although the 
city’s need for additional capacity was not great at the time, the 
mayor and city council decided to move forward with the project 
because the state facilities are major employers in the region and, 
as such, are of significant economic benefit to the city.130 
Over a period of several months, the city worked with the DOC 
and MSOP to create a Wastewater Collection and Facility 
Treatment Plan, which incorporated twenty-year growth 
projections submitted by the city, the DOC, MSOP, and the 
surrounding sewer district.131 Upon completion of the plan, in 
February of 2007, the city obtained state approval for the project, 
secured funding, and began construction.132 During the planning 
stage, the Mayor of Moose Lake and the city administrator 
attempted to negotiate a signed contract with the DOC to bind the 
State to contribute to the project; however, the State refused to sign 
a contract, stating that it could not bind future legislatures to debt 
payments.133 Nevertheless, the city was assured of the State’s 
commitment to payment through increased water-use rates, which 
would be paid periodically until the agreed upon amount was paid 
in full.134 
 
 129.  Telephone Interview with Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake, 
Minn. (Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Mayor Shaw II]; see also Moose 
Lake City Council Minutes 7 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www 
.cityofmooselake.com/resources/Archived_Minutes/June%202007.doc; 
Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. 
 130.  Interview with Mayor Shaw II, supra note 129. 
 131.  See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of 
Moose Lake). The Wastewater Collection and Treatment Facilities Plan was a 
requirement of the State Public Financing Administration. The funding of the 
project was based on projections submitted by the city, the sewer district, and the 
state agencies involved. 
 132.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The project was divided into 
three phases. According to Mayor Shaw, the city alone did not need the increased 
capacity, and in 2007, while the city was meeting with the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Natural 
Resources, various legislative committees, and the Public Finance Agency to secure 
the necessary permits and funding, the State wrote a letter to the city encouraging 
them to include the second and third phases of the project to accommodate the 
State’s needs. Id. Phase one was designed to upgrade and repair the city’s current 
system. Id. Phases two and three were designed to increase capacity to 
accommodate the State’s projected needs. Id. 
 133.  Id. 
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At various points after construction began, MSOP approached 
the city to adjust the plan due to changes in its own proposed 
timeline for expansion.135 During 2010, the city and the DOC 
attempted to negotiate rate increases to cover the cost of the 
project136 but were unable to agree on an acceptable rate.137 Finally, 
in February of 2011, MSOP informed the city that it did not foresee 
a time when it would expand to its previously projected levels and, 
therefore, it would no longer connect to the new line that was built 
to accommodate its previously predicted needs.138 The city 
immediately cancelled the final phase of the project, but was left 
with nearly $900,000 worth of damages, plus the cost of the already-
completed portion.139 MSOP ultimately decided not to complete its 
own planned updates and, therefore, never hooked up to the new 
sewer line the city built for its use, which was capped and sits 
unused adjacent to the state-owned property.140 
 
 135.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The city reacted to these 
changes by adjusting the timeline for phase three of the project and renegotiating 
water rates. Id. The State eventually rejected the proposed rates and the parties 
negotiated a settlement in mediation. See Moose Lake City Council Minutes 
(Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2012 
_Minutes/March%202012 .docx. 
 136.  Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http:// 
www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2010_Minutes/November%202010.doc. 
 137.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111; see Moose Lake City Council 
Minutes (Mar. 14, 2008), supra note 135. 
 138.  Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www 
.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2011_Minutes/February%202011.doc 
(“Leadership from DOC stated that there would not be growth at the Moose Lake 
facility for the next 30 years. DHS indicated that despite the second phase being 
under construction at the MSOP facility no additional flow would be added to the 
city’s wastewater system. City Administrator Vahlsing stated to the state officials 
that construction was well underway for the lagoon expansion. He also stated that 
the expansion was implemented due to state needs and that the state could not 
arbitrarily change it’s [sic] projections and expect not to pay for it’s [sic] portion 
of the expansion.”). 
 139.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. Damages included unpaid 
water bills and the costs of a pond expansion design, construction mobilization, 
plan modification due to DOCs withdrawal, wetland credits and permits 
purchased, and land purchased for additional treatment ponds. Id. According to 
Mayor Shaw, if the city had not received reimbursement from the State for the cost 
of the first two phases of the project and the 650 taxpaying households in the city 
had borne the entire cost, the City of Moose Lake would have had some of the 
highest sewer rates in the country. Id. 
 140.  See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of 
Moose Lake). 
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Moose Lake’s sewer expansion project had an estimated cost 
of $5.1 million.141 Approximately $1.5 million of that was directly 
attributable to the new sewer line built to accommodate the State’s 
facilities.142 An additional $3.775 million was spent to prepare the 
city’s system for the State’s increased capacity.143 When 
municipalities undertake projects of this magnitude, they need 
assurance that each source of funding is reliable. In Moose Lake’s 
case, the city was unable to extract a legal promise to pay from the 
State.144 The city planned and completed the project based on 
projections provided by the State and an agreement that the State 
would help pay for the project.145 City officials never imagined that 
the State, which approached the city to begin the project in the 
first place, would or could back out on its financial commitment.146 
Providing a clear statutory mechanism for the city to bind the 
State prior to beginning work on Moose Lake’s sewer project would 
have (1) reduced or avoided the tension created between the city 
and the State, thus encouraging future cooperation; (2) conserved 
state resources invested in planning, approving, permitting, and 
funding a project that was never completed; and (3) avoided 
payment of a $2 million reimbursement grant147 for which the State 
will see no return. Instead of the reimbursement grant, a 
comparable sum would have been spent over a period of time in 
exchange for increased sewer capacity at the state facilities.148 
Since this controversy, city leadership in Moose Lake has 
determined that it is in the city’s best interests to require the State 
to allocate funds in advance for any infrastructure or public utility 
upgrades it requires.149 Other cities also have had problems 
 
 141.  Moose Lake City Council Minutes 7 (June 13, 2007), supra note 129. 
 142.  Interview with Pat Oman, Moose Lake City Adm’r., in Moose Lake, Minn. 
(Aug. 19, 2013). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The city requested a 
contract but was told that the State could not bind the legislature to future debt 
payments. Id. 
 145.  Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Feb. 9, 2011), supra note 138. 
 146.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. 
 147.  Act of May 23, 2013, ch. 143, art. 4, § 49, 2013 Minn. Laws 1969, 2018 
(appropriating $2 million to Moose Lake as reimbursement for a portion of the 
loss produced by the city’s reliance). 
 148.  Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. 
 149.  Id. After the DOC backed out of the sewer project, it informed the city 
that it needed increased electrical capacity and asked the city to install a new 
transformer at a cost of around $700,000. Id. The city declined and required the 
State to make the investment up front. Id. 
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obtaining financial commitments from the State for improvement 
projects. The City of Minneapolis has a policy of never assessing the 
State or other political subdivision.150 Other cities assess the State, 
only to never receive payment. For example, the City of 
Robbinsdale, a suburb of Minneapolis, has levied special 
assessments on land owned by the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation for improvements abutting developable land owned 
by the State,151 but the State simply has not paid the assessments.152 
The State of Minnesota owns about seventeen percent of the 
land within the state borders, or about 8.4 million acres.153 Much of 
that land is dedicated to state parks and forests, however, other 
state agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, the 
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities systems, and the 
Department of Human Services also own and manage land around 
the state.154 By amending this statute, or creating an alternative 
mechanism for municipalities to bind the State, the legislature 
could help increase certainty of repayment, increase efficiency, 
reduce wasted efforts on projects that will later be cancelled, and 
build trust and cooperation between the State and municipalities. 
D. Dealing with the Problem 
There are various possible ways to deal with the policy issues 
surrounding Minnesota’s special assessment statute. During the 
2013 legislative session, Senator Rod Skoe, of northwestern 
Minnesota, proposed an amendment to Minnesota’s special 
assessment statute that would allow municipalities to bind the State 
to pay special assessments.155 The amendment would have 
empowered municipalities to bind the State, while allowing the 
State to maintain the ability to negotiate the amount of the 
 
 150.  Telephone Interview with Suzette Hjermstad, Supervisor, Minneapolis 
Pub. Works Special Assessment Office (Aug. 15, 2013). 
 151.  The city did not attempt to assess undevelopable land. Telephone 
Interview with Marcia Glick, City Manager, City of Robbinsdale, Minn. 
(Aug. 14, 2013). 
 152.  Interview with William A. Blonigan, City Councilmember, City of 
Robbinsdale, Minn., in Robbinsdale, Minn. (Aug. 1, 2013). 
 153.  JOHN HELLAND, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEP’T, STATE-
OWNED LAND IN MINN. 1 (2002), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd 
/pubs/ss/sssoland.pdf. 
 154.  See id. 
 155.  S.F. 552, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 33 (Minn. 2013). 
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assessment.156 Additionally, the amendment would have required 
the State to make an annual appropriation to pay such special 
assessments.157 
An amendment allowing municipalities to bind the State 
would provide an advantage to municipalities, but it is difficult to 
know what the actual cost of such an amendment would be to the 
State.158 In the absence of this option, municipalities have learned 
to fund their projects without relying on the State, which makes it 
especially difficult to gather reliable data on how much 
municipalities would rely on this option if it were available.159 In a 
survey conducted by the League of Minnesota Cities, thirty-nine of 
fifty-six cities responded that they have not tried to assess the State 
during the last ten years. Seventeen others responded that they had 
tried to assess the State. Of those, eight stated that the State refused 
to pay the assessment; only one reported an assessment successfully 
collected.160 
Additionally, the 2013 proposed amendment provides little 
procedural guidance for the negotiation process employed when 
the State disputes the amount of an assessment levied, nor does it 
appoint a definitive decision maker to turn to when the parties 
cannot reach an agreement.161 One way to solve these problems is 
to avoid negotiation by creating a custom special benefit test or a 
calculation procedure for assessing the State.162 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id.; see supra text accompanying note 38. But see City of Fargo v. State, 
260 N.W.2d 333, 336–38 (N.D. 1977) (holding that even with a statutory mandate, 
it is impossible to require the State to pay assessments because the State relies on 
appropriation to pay). See generally 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1752 (2011) 
(“Since property in public use cannot be sold for delinquent assessments, 
collection may be enforced only by a judgment against the public body controlling 
the property or by an order for it to levy taxes to meet assessments if necessary.”). 
 158.  Telephone Interview with Patrick Hynes, Intergovernmental Relations 
Representative, League of Minn. Cities (July 19, 2013); Telephone Interview with 
Steve Peterson, Senate Tax Comm. Analyst, State of Minn. (July 19, 2013). On the 
other hand, the State would still have the ability to negotiate the amount due, 
thereby controlling the cost. S.F. 552 art. 2, § 33. 
 159.  Telephone Interview with Steve Peterson, supra note 158. 
 160.  League of Minnesota Cities, State Payments Survey Data 9-17 (Sept. 17, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). One of the respondents 
reported an outstanding assessment of over $336,000 dating back to 1985. Id.  
 161.  S.F. 552 art. 2, § 33 (“The [State] may, after consultation and agreement 
by the governing body of the city or town, pay an amount less than the amount 
determined.”). 
 162.  Cf. MINN. STAT. § 473.334 (2012) (defining specific guidelines to 
determine the special benefits received by regional recreation open space 
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The solution might be as straightforward as appointing a 
binding decision maker and adding parameters to guide judicial 
discretion.163 These additions would allow the State to maintain the 
ability to negotiate a lower amount and would provide a framework 
for the decision maker to apply where the parties cannot agree on 
an acceptable assessment amount. Alternatively, the legislature 
could add a provision to the special assessment statutes explicitly 
granting the State the ability to consent to special assessments, 
thereby eliminating any question of whether a consenting state 
owner is an owner under all sections of the statute. This would 
allow municipalities to bind the State once an agreement is 
reached, it would allow the State to maintain its ability to negotiate 
with municipalities, and it would nullify the policy concerns raised 
by the private landowners in Brainerd Investments Partnership.164 
V. CONCLUSION 
The problem of whether or not to include the State in the 
definition of “owner” under Minnesota Statutes section 435.19 has 
come a long way since the attorney general interpretations of the 
statute. The $9.45 million project165 at issue in Brainerd Investments 
Partnership is far removed from the construction of sanitary sewers, 
curbs, and gutters that were at issue when the attorney general 
weighed in.166 The relationship between the State and 
municipalities is complex when it comes to the task of completing 
infrastructure improvements, and it is not uncommon for these 
projects to involve substantial funds from various sources.167 As 
 
property). 
 163.  See, e.g., id. § 282.01 (appointing the county board to determine the 
amount of special benefit conferred on tax-forfeited lands). 
 164.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 153A-205(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 
Reg. Sess.) (stating that state-owned property may be considered in calculating 
frontage and number of owners only if the State has consented to the assessment). 
 165.  Jessi Pierce, 2012 Year in Review: No. 4-College Drive Project Complete, 
BRAINERD DISPATCH (Dec. 21, 2012), http://brainerddispatch.com/extra/2012-12 
-21/no-4-college-drive-project-complete. 
 166.  Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y 
Gen. 1, 1–2 (Oct. 28, 1954) (regarding laying water and sanitary sewer lines); 
Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387b-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 1, 4 (June 29, 1954) 
(regarding construction of a sewer); Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 
56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 133 (June 30, 1936) (regarding construction of six 
blocks of “tarvia, curb, and gutter” improvements). 
 167.  See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 5 n.3 
(“The estimated $6.9 million cost of the Project is to be funded as follows: Federal 
$2,234,300 State Aid $3,809,918 BPU $193,700 Crow Wing County $40,882 Local 
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such, changing the definition of “owner” to “assessable owner” does 
little to solve the underlying problem that the State may refuse to 
pay special assessments.168 In the context of this larger problem, 
whether the State petitions for the improvements, requests them 
informally, or opposes them is a drop in the bucket. 
The court correctly declined to add words to the statute; 
instead, it left the policy issues raised in Brainerd Investments 
Partnership to the legislature.169 Perhaps the most important 
outcome of this decision is that it draws attention to the possibility 
of amending the statute in some manner to give municipalities the 
ability to bind the State to pay special assessments, which would 
relieve private landowners from the anxiety of having to wonder 
whether their omnipotent State neighbor might petition for an 
improvement with no intention to pony up. Furthermore, such an 
amendment would give municipalities security when they develop 
and complete expensive infrastructure improvements that provide 
a special benefit to the State. 
On the other hand, the holding in Brainerd Investments 
Partnership is narrow, as it applies only to the status of the State as 
an owner.170 Perhaps the appellants’ argument that the court’s 
decision has eliminated any line of defense against the use of 
special assessments that serve a non-local purpose goes too far.171 
After all, the argument fails to acknowledge the most powerful and 
important tool the private landowner has that the State does not—
the ability to elect municipal representatives; if private landowners 
are not satisfied with the decisions of their city council, they may 
 
Cost share $621,200[.]”). 
 168.  See MINN. STAT. § 435.19. 
 169.  City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. 
2013). 
 170.  Id. at 758. 
 171.  Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 30. 
Appellants contended that this holding empowers a state instrumentality situated 
across from property zoned for development to “decide to impede that 
development by refusing to sign a petition for improvements even though the 
State intends to refuse to make any voluntary payment towards the project.” Id. 
Accordingly,  
Private property owners who live in areas with large swaths of state-
owned property could not petition for public improvements without 
the consent of the State of Minnesota, even if the State is not going to 
be assessed. Conversely, the State could petition for assessments against 
private property owners on items where the State’s goal is to serve a 
non-local purpose, while keeping the State’s costs at a minimum. 
Id. at 30. 
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vote them out. Additionally, despite the fact that a council may not 
bind the State by use of special assessments, the many other 
controls of Minnesota Statutes chapter 429 will still shield the 
process.172 Finally, cities may still obtain a voluntary contractual 
commitment from the State, as the City of Brainerd did in this case 
to fund its road improvement project.173 
That private landowners and attorneys general have been 
pointing out this inequity for nearly 100 years174 speaks to the 
legitimacy of the landowners’ complaints. Whether the legislature 
will attempt to unravel this complicated relationship between 
municipalities and the State remains to be seen; however, by 
upholding the controversial plain meaning of this statute, the 
supreme court has provided the perfect window of opportunity for 
the legislature to take a hard look at the structure of the statute and 
at its implications on municipal financing. 
 
 172.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(a) (“Before the municipality 
awards a contract for an improvement . . . or before the municipality may assess 
any portion of the cost of an improvement . . . the council shall hold a public 
hearing on the proposed improvement following two publications in the 
newspaper of a notice . . . .”); id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(b) (“Before the adoption of a 
resolution . . . the council shall secure . . . a report advising it in a preliminary way 
as to whether the proposed improvement is necessary, cost-effective, and 
feasible . . . . The report must also include the estimated cost of the improvement 
as recommended. A reasonable estimate of the total amount to be assessed, and a 
description of the methodology used to calculate individual assessments for 
affected parcels, must be available at the hearing.”). 
 173.  Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
 174.  See, e.g., Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 56 Op. Minn. Att’y 
Gen. 133, 133 (June 30, 1936). 
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